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Article 8

As an economic crisis of epic proportions continues to tear through
global economies, Christian Marazzi’s cogent postmortem on the
dot-com crash of 2001 provides a
number of salient critical tools for
a cultural approach to finance and
crisis.1 Marazzi’s autonomist Marxist2 analysis—lucidly translated from
the Italian by Gregory Conti—
Capital and Language: From
draws its conceit from outside
the New Economy to the War
the established parameters of ecoEconomy by Christian Marazzi.
nomic inquiry: language. While
Translated by Gregory Conti.
his thought-provoking and broadLos Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008.
minded book makes an original
Pp. 180. $14.95 paper.
and important contribution to how
we think about finance, it is regrettable that its English translation
has been so long in coming and
that we may have to wait just as
long again for his insights on the
current economic crisis.
Posing the capitalism of the erstwhile “New Economy” as in some
way linguistic goes beyond a rhetorical gesture aimed at upsetting
the hubristic hegemony of economics and its claims to scientific realism. Rather, for Marazzi, in an age
of globalization, capital and language are intimately bound up on
three interrelated levels (9). In the
first place, the global web of financial transactions, the “real economy”
(to which those financial transactions ostensibly refer) and everything in-between are increasingly
held together by the fabric of language. From the linguistically saturated service sector to management
of global supply chains to the vital
role of the media and entertainment
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industries, language is economic
like never before, underwriting the
coordination of global flows (50).
Second, Marazzi suggests that
financial conventions—the norms
and codes by which something as
sublimely complex as the international derivatives or futures markets
can exist, flourish, and dominate
the global economy—are networks
of performative speech-acts that
unify economic actors in a selfreferential lingua-financial community (28–29, 33–36). Not only does
this community rely heavily on
communicative themes like trust,
credit (credibility), and information,
but financial instruments obtain
value largely through performative acts where certain actors and
institutions exercise the ability
to shape perceptions and actions
through the production of financial
representation. For instance, a bondrating firm’s3 pronouncement of a
bundle of dubious subprime mortgages as “triple-A” in effect makes
it so. Or, in different ways, the performative utterances (even the bodily
comportment) of a central-bank chief
can have a massive impact on national and international markets
that “read” him.
These two relations between
language and capital are underscored by a third, more profound
and deeply ontological connection:
in the post-Fordist New Economy,
capital is no longer interested merely
in extracting surplus value from
workers in factories, as per the classical Marxist formulation. Rather,

it has invested itself in all aspects of
life as a global form of social control4 marked by the cyborgian conflation of living (human) and dead
(technological) labor across the social body. Consider, for instance,
the case of the phone-sex worker
who is paid by the hotline per call
he or she receives at home—living
and dead labor here cannot be easily separated. Less salaciously, the
massive economic productivity of
health, education, culture, and
human-development sectors speaks
to the way capital’s circuit of value
has decidedly escaped the factory
and is increasingly invested in human bodies. In this phase of the
real subsumption of labor under
capital language—that syntax of
human cooperation, that living
fabric from which the social web is
continuously spun—becomes the
key terrain of struggle. Within
this broader framework, finance’s
ability to redouble and coordinate
money’s power as a claim on future
labor is haunted by fresh contradictions in whose face previous
“fixes”5 to capitalist contradictions
are no longer reliable.
The project of Marazzi’s book is
to demonstrate how these three
linguistic aspects of the New Economy can weave something like a
global financial market—the scope,
speed, and power of which are as
unprecedented6 as they are unfathomable. To do so, Marazzi
seeks to complicate our understanding of the tension between the
New Economy on the one hand
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and post-Fordism on the other,
suggesting that new patterns of finance cannot be separated from
new modalities of work. The crucial
link between the two is communication and information technology
that enables the increasing flexibilization or “autonomization” of
global workforces (49). The trends
toward temporary and contract
work, casual employment, selfemployment, and ubiquitous precarity are, by now, well known. But
Marazzi suggests that the confluence
of finance and technology expands
the sphere of work beyond the “factory” and represents the capacity of
capital to increasingly reach deep
into people’s lives, rendering nearly
all time valuable (not just that time
spent “on the job”). From the way
that social relations are increasingly
commodified to the way consumption of media has become productive
of financial value to the way savings
and pensions have become embroiled
in the speculative financial economy,
capital seeks to “put to work the
entire lives of workers [and their]
linguistic community” (50).
Finance is crucial to this recomposition of labor and life for a
few reasons: it coordinates the restructuring of firms toward “lean
production,” outsourcing, and deskilling; it sponsors the rampant
overproduction of technology and
immaterial sectors; and it has massive disciplinary powers to shape
state, firm, and individual behaviors through its grip on debt, bonds,
and investments.
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Marazzi advances his conceptualization of the financial sphere per
se as a linguistic community whose
ability to produce value (or at least
to produce instruments that create
social wealth with real social
power) is based on shared linguistic norms or conventions established between economic actors by
performative speech-acts. The creation of a derivative product, the
securitization of a bundle of loans,
and the more general ascription of
a value to a collection of economic
conjectures are all acts of representation that actors submit to the financial community like a joke at a
party. Sometimes people fail to pick
up on the joke and it falls flat, but,
more often, it is greeted with an infectious laughter and everyone has
a good time (except, of course,
those not invited or the invisible
serving staff). And, as we all know,
this rarely has anything to do with
how “objectively” funny or topical
the joke is; the spread of laughter
(and let’s say this is a particularly
neurotic party made up of people
who believe themselves to be in existential competition) is stimulated
by the momentum generated by a
combination of feelings of personal
mirth, the desire to be in on the
joke, and the authority or social
status of the joke teller. Similarly,
performative financial offerings
succeed based on a combination of
individual interest-seeking, a “herd
mentality,” and the institutional
and financial gravitas of the utterer.7 Financial crises, in Marazzi’s
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paradigm, are crises of the linguistic conventions that hold the community together or of the structure
of authority within that community. These are crises of the “overproduction of self-referentiality” in
which a financial instrument’s ability to reflect underlying economic
“realities” become suspect and there
is turbulence in the conventional
suspension of disbelief (33–36). This
crisis expands exponentially based
on the same “mimetic rationality”
that provides the essential “herd”
momentum. Somehow, after a few
too many jokes fall flat, nothing
seems funny anymore and everyone reaches for their drinks.
Marazzi’s single most important
intervention is to move us beyond
both neoclassical and reductive
Marxist approaches to finance capital that either take its claims to
produce value as pure fact (in the
case of the former) or pure fiction
(in the case of the latter) (59).
Marazzi insists we contextualize
and historicize finance as part of
broader transformations of a globalizing capitalism and see them
not as the worst excesses of an old
pattern but as an intimate and demonstrative part of the way the general intellect has come to be centrally
at stake in the global capitalist (dis)
order. Marazzi’s conceptualization
of the general intellect draws heavily on the work of Paolo Virno,8
who is among the scholars to rescue the term from Marxist obscurity and nurse it back to health as a
description of the socially ambient

baseline of social and technological
skills and competencies (and, we
could add, the “cultural commons”)
that make human cooperation possible in historically specific ways.
For Virno and Marazzi, postFordism sees this general intellect
put to work in the interests of capital because it is now merged directly with information technology
and the body (41–45). The labor of
social cooperation no longer takes
place in the shadow of the machine
(as Marx spoke of when he discussed the tensions between living
and dead labor in the industrial age)
but through the machine, through
the “humanization of fixed capital”
(10).9 The result is an economy of
what Marazzi calls “increasing returns,” a phrase that recalls and
seeks to upgrade Marx’s “law of the
falling rate of profit” for an information age. Where once intercapitalist competition saw an overall
drop in value production because
of the increasing investment in
machines (constant capital) relative
to human labor (whose exploitation
as “variable capital” was the source
of all true value),10 today, because
the proliferation of machines has
become the very means of living
labor, the problem is not that there
is not enough value being produced,
but that there may be too much
(60–61). This tendency is only intensified by the ease with which
“intangible” assets like ideas, computers, and culture are digitally replicated. These factors contribute to
a confusion of market signals and
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previously reliable signs of crisis,
reflected in the preposterous hyperspeculation in dot-com stocks
on the eve of the bursting of the
2001 technology bubble (92–93).11
Here Marazzi introduces one of
his least compelling concepts: the
idea that the New Economy of
increasing returns generates an
excess of “information” (or, more
broadly, intangible commodities)
for which there is not enough “attention” due to workers having an
increasing proportion of their time
of living taken up by new forms of
work, leaving little time to consume (65–68). Marazzi is trying to
renovate a theory of overproduction and crisis for a digital economy, but the concepts get fuzzy as
to whether information and attention are new modalities of capital
or simply metaphors for underlying economic “realities.” It is also
unclear how new forms of work
that produce “information” and
the consumptive labor of “attention”
are mutually exclusive: telemarketers Facebook at work, fast-food
workers listen to commercial radio
on the job, and academics frantically network during their social
lives. Further, it is hard to see how
Marazzi’s information/attention
accounting can move us toward
more provocative spaces of resistance: one isn’t sure whether one
ought to frantically multitask or
fall into an elective coma.
Much of Marazzi’s book is taken
up by a historicization of the 2001
dot-com crash, an ambitious project
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for a short book. In general, Marazzi
offers a corrective to the idea—still
prevalent today—that financial
crashes are anomalous panicked
stampedes of ill-informed investors out for a quick buck (or, better,
the fault of racialized inner-city
American families who somehow
pulled the wool over the eyes of the
financial community to finance the
purchase of homes they had been
living in for thirty years). Instead,
he argues that the herd mentality
and panic itself are endemic to the
sphere of financial speculation
(23–24). He traces the ways in
which, since the monetarist turn in
American fiscal policy in the 1970s,
there has been a seismic shift from
public savings (government bonds,
central-bank regulation of financial markets, collective savings) to
private securitization as mutual
funds, national debt, and the new
wealth of global elites rushed toward the promise of high returns
from investment in speculative
capital (37–40, 74). This “socialization of finance” (16), which saw
economic growth without significant inflation (“disinflation” in
Marazzi’s terminology), was borne
on the backs of workers around
the globe whose flexibilization and
increasing precarity at the hands of
new technology exacerbated trends
in personal debt and government
deficit spending (89–90). Such a
process was part and parcel of a
broader shift in the logic of centerperipheral global relations from
imperialism to “Empire” (78–87).
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Where states themselves become
subject to the policing of international finance,12 we are witnessing
the emergence of a global sovereignty beyond the nation-state, a
“concentration without centralization” of capitalist power.
This thesis was most comprehensively laid out in Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri’s Empire, which
suggests that shifts in the tenor of
global capitalist power cannot be
separated from new forms of work
and new information, communication, and financial technologies.
Marazzi’s contribution to this corpus is a more rigorously politicaleconomic approach. Unlike Empire,
Capital and Language was first published in 2002, and its final chapter
appears as something of an afterword in light of the September
11th attacks and the subsequent
War on Terror. Marazzi suggests
that the latter is, in effect, “the continuation of the New Economy by
other means” (151–52), and that it
came at a crucial moment, giving
the overproduction of immaterial
and technological innovation (which
had caused the 2001 dot-com crash)
a new outlet in the burgeoning military and surveillance technology
markets. Further, in the wake of
the “crisis of representation” that the
dot-com crash represented (echoed
by growing social movement unrest
and global solidarity), the War on
Terror offered a new representational paradigm to justify and frame
the reigning global disorder and
explain its multifold contradictions

and compulsory global asymmetries. (Both “fixes” only worked for
so long, if our current economic
crisis is any indication).
Marazzi’s understanding of financial crises as crises of representation is an extremely fruitful
offering for cultural critics seeking
to make sense of this crisis and the
forms of cultural expression and
response it is generating. Particularly evocative is his treatment of
the question of panic,13 a word he
traces back to the classical goat god
of nature Pan, a liminal figure
through whom ancient Greeks mediated natural instinct and rational
action, individual reason and groupthink. Similarly, Panic is the normal
liminal condition of the capitalist
confusion of self-interested individualism and the “herd behavior”
of market speculation (127–31).
Panic attacks or crises are not
moments of irrationality in an otherwise orderly economy but a
moment where the underlying linguistic solidifications of endemic
panic break down—they are crises,
first and foremost, of representation.
The crisis is “the disarticulation of
language,” a general incredulity to
the order of signs that, formerly,
seemed such reliable indicators of
the underlying realities of social
and economic value, or the ability
of capital to command future labor.
To be in a panic is to be rendered
speechless, incapable of producing
representations; it is the proliferation of in-credible (not-creditworthy) speech-acts and the failure
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of linguistic authority. Credit dries
up, and liquidity, the ability to
transform speculation into other
forms of capital, calcifies. In short,
the crisis, in Marazzi’s paradigm, is
squarely ontological in the sense
that the performative and discursive web that makes up social reality, that series of representational
acts stacked precariously skyward
atop one another, falls like the proverbial house of cards and its foundations on the shifting sands of
linguistic play (to mix our metaphors) are laid bare. Thanks to
the “socialization of finance” that
increasingly embroils the world’s
populations in personal, consumer,
and government debt and credit,
the crisis is not limited to the financial world. Such an analysis is important for cultural critics because
it indicates that representation is a
fundamental terrain of economic
struggle, compelling us to revisit
tenacious theoretical errors that
would relegate the two spheres to
opposite sides of the playground.
Further, Marazzi insists that panic
is the order of the behavior of the
global multitude when it is artificially unified under the sovereignty
of finance capitalism into a politicoontological community, and that, if
anything, crises set the stage for
the multitudinous autogestion and
self-valorization using the abundant technologies of the general
intellect (127, 140–44). In other
words, crises offer moments where
the reigning paradigms of representation fail to hold the world together,
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highlighting the immanent urgency
of cultural politics.14
One wonders why Marazzi opts
for “language” when it would seem
“culture” or even “communications”
would do a similar work with
broader implications. Indeed, given
that Marazzi’s use of the term language is not about the play of signs
and meanings but rather about the
power of linguistic communities,
there aren’t a lot of places in Capital
and Language where language could
not more productively (or at least
evocatively) be replaced by the
term culture. Perhaps it is because
those associated with the Italian
Autonomia movement of the 1970s
understand culture and cultural
struggle in a different way. Or perhaps it is because there is a rich scientistic tradition in the study of
semiotics in which radical politicaleconomy can find a kindred spirit.15 From the parallel progressive
abstractions of language (from
phoneme to sign to metaphor)
and capital (from labor power to
money to finance) to the striking
resemblance between the problems of textual translation and the
famous “transformation” problem
of value and price, there does seem
to be a lot of theoretical insight latent in the dialogue between studies of language and capital,16 but
Marazzi stops short of this sort of
work. It seems to me that the focus on language, as opposed to
culture, risks missing some of the
important lessons of cultural criticism that could inform a renewed
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inquiry into the vicissitudes of finance capital.
There are several other drawbacks to Capital and Language. For
one, its layout is less than linear, so
it is often difficult to follow the
causal relationships between factors, something that is perhaps unavoidable when dealing thoroughly
with something as complex as
global finance. Although Marazzi’s
analysis of the linguistic nature of
the financial community is compelling, it is not clear where the
borders of this community are: is it
just the key high-flying institutional traders who dominate the
market, everyone whose money is
invested in a pension fund, or everyone on the planet whose fates
are bound up in Empire? Those
suspicious of or fatigued by Hardt
and Negri’s enthusiasm for immaterial, affective, and informational
labor or the nebulous promise of
the multitude will not find respite
in Marazzi’s application of these
themes. And despite his autonomist roots, Marazzi’s approach is
one of a political economy that
takes as its starting point and object of analysis shifts in the nature
of capital, rather than resistance,17
and, hence, largely fails to articulate struggle except at the level of
high abstraction. In terms of Marazzi’s economic argument, broader
contextual and statistical evidence
about the rise of immaterial work
(or even the qualitative shift toward
capital’s reliance on the general intellect) would make for a more

broadly compelling argument, and
several crucial factors in the development of global finance receive
only passing mention (for example,
international currency markets,
the role of organizations like the
World Trade Organization, and a
more systematic analysis of the
politics of international debt).
Many of these absences and vagaries have been addressed elsewhere in Marazzi’s corpus but are
not available in English translation.18 All that being said, however,
Marazzi’s book is an extremely important contribution, especially for
those developing cultural theories
of finance capital, as well as those
sympathetic to autonomist approaches seeking to understand the
current crisis. Of course, times
have changed since the 2002 release
of Marazzi’s book. Our current
economic crisis makes the 2001
dot-com crash seem like an illheeded warning tremor. Near the
end of his book, Marazzi argues
that “Clinton and Bush represent
two different conjugations of the
same problem: the global regulation of the New Economy” (153).
One could add to this list Obama,
whose financial cabinet and agenda
appear to represent no fundamental change from the orientation of
his predecessors and who seems to
be satisfied in mobilizing the financial authority of the state like
an earnest pawnbroker, holding the
precious treasures of the American
economy (banks, insurance houses,
car companies) in trust until capital
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can get back on its feet and reclaim
them. It is to be hoped that Marazzi’s current work will be translated
with all haste, as he, perhaps more
than others of his camp, is likely to
provide insights that can move us
beyond the tepid and confused
neo-Keynesianist anachronism that
today stumbles across the political
spectrum from right to left.
—McMaster University
NOTES
1. See, for example, David Harvey, The
Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry
into the Origins of Cultural Change
(Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990);
David Harvey, “The Art of Rent:
Globalization and the Commodification of Culture,” in Spaces of Capital:
Towards a Critical Geography (New
York: Routledge, 2001), 394–411;
Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee,
Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2004); Randy Martin,
Financialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002);
and Randy Martin, An Empire of
Indifference: American War and the
Financial Logic of Risk Management
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2007).
2. Marazzi was and continues to be an
intellectual figure of this movement,
collaborating closely with Antonio
Negri and Sergio Bologna and editing,
along with Sylère Lotringer, one of the
seminal collections of autonomist texts
in English translation, Autonomedia:
Post-Political Politics, now in its second
edition (New York: Semiotext[e],
2007).
3. See Timothy J. Sinclair, The New
Masters of Capital: American Bond
Rating Agencies and the Politics of
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Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2008).
4. This thesis will be familiar to readers
of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s
Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000) and Multitude
(New York: Penguin, 2004), as well as
those more broadly sympathetic to the
autonomist approach, which understands capitalism as invested in the
“social factory” and what has lately
been termed “biopolitical production.”
5. Although Marazzi does not use the
term fixes, he does speak to the
previous ways the contradictions of
capital have been overcome by
strategies as diverse as imperialism,
war, and the development of middleclass workers. For a comprehensive
overview of Marx’s approach to these
problems that reconstructs his scattered
speculations on finance and speculation, see David Harvey, Limits to
Capital, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 2006).
6. Marazzi argues that, while so-called
“evolutionist” narratives of global
trade, such as Paul Hirst and Graham
Thompson’s Globalization in Question:
The International Economy and the
Possibilities of Governance, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge: Polity, 1999), correctly
point out that prior moments of
capitalist accumulation have seen
greater degrees of international
economic integration, they typically fail
to take into account the broader shifts
in the “mode of production” and the
“transformation in the nature of work”
that the confluence of the New
Economy and post-Fordism represent
today on a global scale (88).
7. One is reminded of Patrice Leconte’s
depiction, in his 1996 film Ridicule, of
the volatile economy of wit at
Versailles on the eve of revolution
where the careers of courtiers (and
the fate of the country) was decided
by a circuit of value based on the
complex linguistic games of insulated
aristocrats.
8. See, for instance, Paolo Virno,
A Grammar of the Multitude: For an
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Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life,
trans. Isabella Bertoletti, James
Cascaito, and Andrea Casson (New
York: Semiotext[e], 2003). For one of
the best excursus on the general
intellect in English, see Nick DyerWitheford, Cyber-Marx: Cycles and
Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology
Capitalism (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1999).

9. The incessant drive to make children
computer savvy—from computer
classes in schools to the commercialization of children’s play in video games
to the breathless neoliberal fantasia of
“one laptop per child”—gives some
indication of the spectrum of forces at
work to ensure everyone is plugged into
the global linguistic circuit of capitalmanaged cooperation. The “one laptop
per child” “movement” rests upon the
faith that poverty, corruption, and lack of
(Western) democracy in the underdeveloped world is the result of insufficient
market exposure or inefficient or
distorted markets due to poor
information infrastructure (see, for
instance, www.laptop.org).
10. A process most lucidly explained by
Harvey (Limits to Capital). Indeed, as
Harvey makes clear, finance itself is a
“fix” or abstractive displacement of
these contradictions.
11. Scholars of culture will find the history
of bubbles fascinating. The 1720 “South
Sea Bubble” (the first recorded wide
application of the term) saw literary
luminaries, including Jonathan Swift,
Daniel Defoe, Alexander Pope, and
Samuel Johnson, caustically abuse the
“stock-jobbers” whose barbaric
speculation on colonial venture laid
waste to the emerging bourgeois
economy of the day. These texts have
been collected, along with contemporary
analysis, in a three-volume set edited by
Ross B. Emmett, Great Bubbles: Reactions
to the South Sea Bubble, the Mississippi
Scheme and the Tulip Mania Affair
(London: Pickering and Chatto, 2000).
12. This theme is dealt with more comprehensively by LiPuma and Lee (Financial

Derivatives). Although Marxists have
long argued that imperialism is
characterized by the rule of finance,
Marazzi believes that the present
moment is qualitatively different
because of the importance of new
technology and the general intellect.
13. This section was previously published
under a different translation as
Christian Marazzi, “Who Killed God
Pan?” trans. Taina Rajanti, Ephemera 4
no. 3 (2004): 181–86.
14. Marazzi’s optimism should be
tempered (and likely is, elsewhere)
with the very real threat that crises can
be the breeding pools of fascism whose
proponents have the advantage of
being unfettered by concerns over the
democracy, equality, and multiplicity
of their movements or futures. For a
meditation on this theme, see, for
instance, Crystal Bartolovich,
“Organizing the (Un)Common,”
McMaster Institute on Globalization and
the Human Condition Working Paper
Series 8, no. 6 (2008), http://globalization
.mcmaster.ca/wps.htm.
15. This has been variously attempted. See,
for instance, Jean Baudrillard, For a
Critique of the Political Economy of the
Sign, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis:
Telos, 1981); and Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, “Scattered Speculations on the
Question of Value,” Diacritics 15, no. 4
(1985): 73–93.
16. For a recent overview of this problematic, see Anitra Nelson, Marx’s Concept
of Money: The God of Commodities
(London: Routledge, 1999).
17. See Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital
Politically (1979; repr., Edinburgh: AK,
2000).
18. Some of Marazzi’s work in translation,
as well as that of many fascinating
scholars of a similar mind, can be
found at the excellent website
www.generation-online.org/.

